Abstract: The argument in thls paper is that although rationality and marality are distinguishable concepts, there is nevertheless a rational marality, a set of principles, namely, which it is rational of oll to require of oll. The argument of this paper is that such a marality would certainly issue in a generat condemnation of aggressive war. (Whether this also makes it irrational for Stetes to engage in such actlvities is another, a.nd not entirely settled, matter.) Correlatively, it would issue in a strong right of defense. Would this rig h t be sufficient to include resort to nuclear deterrence, if need be? lt is argued that the answer must be in the affirmative -olt hough t he question of 'need' is by no means settled in cu rrent circumstances.
Background
There is o certoin optimism implicit in t he title of this poper -not by virtue of my using the notions of "reason" and of "morality" in the same breath with thot of nucleor deterrence, but rather in the commonly used expression "nucleor deterrence" itself. The ideo thot nucleor weapons ore here only to deter is definitely optimistic. Were some holders of nucleor weapons to have radlcally differing purposes -modmen intent on blowing us oll to bits due to some inner hang -up, or nations bent on enslaving us oll, thot sort of thing -then we should have couse for even mare alarm than has been manifest omong sensitive people for the post severol decades. If, however, these awesome weapons are indeed here only to deter oggression, then there is at least ground for hope. Or at least there is if we we con find a tolerably clear ond not too ideologically loaded notion of "ogg ression". Now, both of the sides in today's world do moke this claim. If you ask either side why it has these weapons, it will say, "because we must prevent the other side from committing aggression". Neither will ollow that its utilizotion of so much megatonnage is for ony other purpose, purposes such as t he aforementioned, say, or that of bringing the entire world within the embrace of its own political system or empire, or whatever. These ore roundly disavowed. So far, so good.
There is admittedly room to question the rationality of using nuclear weapons for purposes of conquest. The lesson of Chernobyl is itself sufficient to give pause to any nation imagining that it would have anything to gain by actually using such weapons. At best, it might have something to gain by threatening to use them on a recalcitrant victim. But the threat, upon closer inspection, would likely prove idle. This doubtful rationality of aggressive use of nuclear weapons doubtless contributes to the plausibility of my proposing to accept, for present purposes, the claims of each great power that deterrence and not aggression is indeed its object in manufacturing, stockpiling, and deploying these weapons.
Once accepted, however, we must address the question whether the policies of those great powers make very much sense. lf A claims that she is undertaking a certain set of actions only to be 'deterring' B, while B in turn insists that he is· only 'deterring' A in undertaking a similar set of actions, there is a prima facie logical problem: what, then, does each have to deter? If A supposed that B was perfectly serious about this, and A was herself perfectly serious about her own intentions, it would seem that we should expect A to cease engeging in the actions in question.
Clearly we have a problem of credibility here, at least. Apparently neither A nor B really does believe what each claims t o believe. Of course the sheer existence of a sizable nuclear force complete with missiles to deliver them is rather threatening in itself; the perception that somebody eise has such a thing is bound to be some cause for alarm. But nor is it plausible to suppose that either of today's great powers is quite sure of the opposite Supposition: namely, that the other is just waiting to pounce the momen t it has the chance. In various respects, their behavior does not reflect that assumption -though it sometimes comes closer than one would like. Meanwhile, it is of interest to ask what the major powers should be doing in the present circumstances, supposing that their professions of fundamentally peaceful interest are sincere.
Why is this of interest? After oll, are not sovereign nations notoriously indifferent to 'moral' considerations? Are we not forced to recognize that Stetes will do what they conceive to be in their interests, and that is that? Is it not, therefore, futile to engage in any sort of ethical consideration of such problems as this?
It does behoove us to be ·clear about the answers to these questions. I shall suggest that their air of challenge to inquiries such as this is not as impressive as may seem. Roughly, my reply is that yes, States will indeed -in some sense -do what they conceive to be in their interests, but also that we should not hastil y ad d, "An d that's that! " . In fact, that is not that. To recognize such truth as there is in this ancient cliche is to begin the discussion, not to end it.
As o matte r of foct, Stetes sometimes hove reocted quite specificolly to what they conceive to be maral considerotions, just as hove individuols. The "whot they conceive to be" qualificotion is important. lt is independently rather plausible, it is widely claimed, and I will certoinly assume, that at least some States, perhops including the Superpowers of today, do genuinely differ to some degree in their maral views. The extent of this variotion, however, is importont. For the view I shall propose here is thot so lang os this variation is kept within certain very, very broad Iimits, we con identify o sort of 'super -marality' which oll porties have good reason to accept, and therefore to which oll may rotionolly appeal. Moreover, I believe thot this is to o considero ble degree recognized in the actual rela tions omong Stetes today -though in some cases t he recognitlon is too nearly on the Ievel of 'lip service'. But I don't think that the current Superpowers are as guilty as some others in this respect. Which ogoin means, I believe, thot there is hope.
Rationolity
In osking for a charocterization of 'rational marolity' -o set of principles that is both recognizably rational and recognlzably maral -many will suppose that we set ourselves an impossible task. Either, they soy, we will come up with something that requires an idiosyncrotic ond questionbegging view of rationality, or we will do the same with our proposals about marallty, or both. That is the chollenge. Nevertheless, I think it can be met, and thot the characterization I sholl offer involves no unacceptoble 'fudging' with either notion. Nor is my chorocterization original, going back os it does in some respects to Hobbes ond Hume, ond leoning especially heavily on the recent work of Dovid Gou t hier (1986).
First, Iet us Iook ot the notion of rationallty, in deportment. Here we ore content with the standerd current sociol sciences (in sofar os there is one): to be rational is its proctlcal account in the to order one's actions in such o woy os to maximize the realizotion on one's considered preferences, or in short, one's interests. We can characterize 'interests' here quite broadly. lndeed, it would be equally satisfoctory he r e to use the term "volues", so lang as we unde r s tand by this those states of affairs to which the ogent whose rationality is in question ottaches volue, rother thon those states of affoirs which really ore valuable whotever the agent might think. There ore, of course, many ond serious questions for any ogent to oddress in t his Ietter regord (some provocative questions ore raised obout this matter in Bond 1983) . Do some of one's preferences need odjustment, somehow? Hove we given vorlaus areas of our Jives enough ottention? How do we bolonce the lang run ogainst the short run? But the chorocterizotion of reoson here does not require thot we resolve such problems. They can, insteod, be viewed os personal problems for the ogent. At any given time, we ossume thot our agent does have a set of interests thot offord o guide to oction, and if thot is locking, then we simply hove no woy to opproise the octions of thot ogent in terms of their rationolity or lrrotionolity. If we wish to soy thot an ogent who has obsolutely no ldeo whot to do becouse he has absolutely no idea what he wants is 'irrational', thot is becouse we ossume that there ore posslble conditions of thot ogent which he reolly does prefer, or would prefer if he knew whot they were like. But an ogent who hos genuinely no ideo whot he wonts would not oppreciote the truth of ony such cloim, ond if not, then while we moy soy , moking an evoluotion, thot he is foolish, we con't reolly convlct him usefully of irrotionolity. Nor, I hasten to odd, is there ony reoson for theoreticol concern obout such a 'person'. He moy sofely be ignored.
This chor octerizotlon also poses problems when we ottempt to ossess the rotionolity of the octions of Stotes rother thon individuols. Of course in the first lnstance the octions we con opproise ore the octions of the Stote's ogents ond Ieaders. Just whot the relation is between such actions and those of the State itself is not an easy matter to formulote; but what we con soy is that lf we know how to opprolse the former set of actlons sufficiently, we s holl hove whotever we could wont regording the latter. For when ogents of Stotes act, they act in whot they toke to be that Stote's interests, ond if our ossessment of thelr Stotes' interests differs from their ossessment, we sholl hove o situotion onologous to the one with the fool obove. Either those octors will not have token sufficient occount of the situotion ond so will not moximlze the interests of their Stote os t hey see it; or it will simply come down to o difference of view of whot thot Stote should be striving for, in which cose the suggestion thot their ogents ore foiling to oct 'rotionolity' is not plausible.
Notlee thot our characterizotion of rotionollty has nothing 'morol' obout it, one woy or the other. We do not, for instonce, ossume thot the re is o Cotegoriol Imperative ot the heort of procticol reoson, comToa ndlng the ogent to oct controry to his interests. We do not ossume thot the rational ogent ottoches equol weight to the similor interests of other ogents or other beings generally. Nor do we ossume that the rational ogent would be onxious to morch in step with the World Spirit. If morality is to turn out to be rational, on this view of rotionolity, it will not be because we hove begged t he question by building some view of morolity in from the stor t .
Morolity
Whot about Morality, then? To stort, we mu st not identify the concept of morolity with, for instonce, thot of procticol rotionolity itself, os chorocterized above. This would be both r edundant and implousible. Nor, however, do we wont to identify it with ony porticulor view of morolity. We wont an onolysls of mor olity thot, hopefully, will enoble us to opproise proposed moralities, but not one thot is simply itself o morolity. The proposed characterizotion is os follows. Morolity, we say, is that set of principles for the guidance of everyone's behavior whlch (a) is to be authoritotive in the sense of overriding individual interests if need be, ond (b) is to be unive r solly, informally reinforced in the group whose morollty ls in question. Thus the definition cantoins a variable renging over 'groups', which determine who is 'everyone' for the pur pose at hand. However, there is an important limit ing case, the cose where the group ls slmply everyone there is. Whether there can be such o univer so I morolity is an important ond discussable question r elative to this definition; it does not presuppose an affirmative answer, but does not preclude it elther.
Notice also thot the chorocterizotion uses the expression "is to be", rother than simply "is", in its two clauses. We must be fairly precise about the sense of this phrase. First, lt enables us to make a distinction between 'de facto' ond 'de jure' marality. The actual morality of a group, if it hos one, is identified wlth thot set of principles which is in fact universally or neor-universally reinforced in thot group, of thot morolity which members of the group do actuolly aspire to or avow even if practice Iogs behind preachlng. However, we may also t hink thot the marality of some grau p, or of oll humankind, con be improved, even relative to its aspirations os dlstinct from its proctice. In thot case, "is to be" indicates that the theorist whose proposal it is believes that she or he has found reasons why the members of that group should reinforce o different set of principles from those it currently does or currently aspires to.
Thus the project for o 'rational morality' is to identify reasons of the Ietter kind. But this brings up an importont issue. My chorocterizotion of morolity has been in terms of principles to be 'reinforced'. The scope for considerotions of rotionolity here, therefore, is on the rotionality of enforcing o given set of principies (not necessorily by force of orms ; most marol reinforcement is; of course, verbal or on the Ievel of 'bodylanguoge'). But what obout the rotionolity of actuolly doing whot those principles coll upon one to do? This is undoubtedly o very important question, and perhops especiolly so in the present context, that of nucleor deterrence. My answer to it is slightly complex, but not, I think, devious. (I first represented this view in print in Nervesan 1985a.) First, recoll thot the definition speoks in terms of universal reinforcement, in two respects: on the one hand, e veryone is to porticipote in the vorious octivities of 'reinforcement' -proise ond blome, ordering ond commendlng, rewording ond punishing, ond so on; but also, these principles or e ( to be) directed ~ everyone's conduct; ond of course one of those whose conduct is in question, therefore, is the ogent himself. This colls for o ward of explonation.
My formulo is not intended to incorporote, os o port of its meoning, ony further requlrement of 'univer solizobillty' of vorlaus kinds fomilior in the philosophicol Iiterature (see Norveson 1985b). E.g., it does not meon thot t hese principles may make no distinction s omang roces, sexes, closses, or for thot matter individual persons, os o matter of 'logic' . An eliglble condidote to consider os o morol principle, for instonce, might be "Everyone is to do whotever promotes the moxlmum sotisfoction of Jon Norveson" ( fomilior other condidotes: the 'World Spirit', or 'The Proletariat'). These possible morol principles ore not ruled out on grounds of meoning -but, os we will shortly see, they ore rejected on the bosis of their content. All such formulotions will indeed be irrational morolities, but not loglcolly incoherent morolities . Thot they ore not excluded on the bosis of meoning is evident, howeve r , when we consider thot it is quite conceivoble t hot o certoin group should oll reinforce on everyone the requirement t hot they moximize the interests of some one person or smoll, orbitrorily chosen group of persons, or for thot matter thot they poy certoin kinds of ottention to o certoin clump of Secred Trees. Not only is this conceivoble, bu t it is difficult to resist the conclusion thot o fair number of human groups do octuolly hove principles of some such sort.
Nevertheless, the person proposing o certoin view of morolity, o certoln set of principles for universal observonce ond reinforcement, hos o serious problern on he r honds if she is ot oll seriou s obout her proposol. For the reinforcement colled for in our definition is, os I put it, 'informal'. We ore not he r e speoking of the kind of reinforcement provided by the police or the ormy or, for thot matter, the Supreme Politburo of Community Elders. We ore speoking of reinforcement by everyone, ond this consists of voluntory octions performed by individuols octing occording to their vorious llghts. Among these lights is sure to be ot least o consideroble residual omount of sheer self-interest, for instonce. Thu s when our hypot heticol morol reformer comes olong, urglng oll to kowtow to Herself or to port one's hoir exclusively on the left, or to Iiek the boots of those wlth white skin, or whotever, whot is she to do obout those recolcitront individuols who hoppen not to give o hoot obout Herself or who hoppen to like porting t heir hoir in the centre, or who hove no porticulor offection for white-skinned persons? lf they see no reoson from their point of view to go olong with t he proposol, then, if they ore rational, they simply won't. And thot will be thot for the p r oposed principle! In o lorge comrunity of tolerobly rational ogents, p r oposals of ony such sort hove o very short life-expectoncy. Rotionolity on our chorocterizotion is essentiolly individual. All individuol s will hove interests thot ore substontiolly influenced by their sociol milieus, of course; ond some will hove interests so strongly identified with other group members os to encouroge some philosophers to think thot this shows 'individuolism' to be an untenoble ond bizarre doctrine. The theory of rotionolity proposed mokes no ossumption s obout this. The fact is, of course, t ho t people differ greotly in their interests, not only from individual to individual within virtuolly oll groups, but still more notobly from one group to onother. The foct thot rotionolity is individual in ou r chorocterizotion enobles us to occomodote oll these sorts -which indeed is o moin port of the point of the chorocterizotion. Now the point is thot if we ore to p rop ose o morolity for o very )arge group, especiolly one composed of very diverse sub-groups -such os the Group of All Humons -then the proposol will hove no hope of odoption if it does not also ~ to everyone. Which meons thot it must hove the well-known feotu res: it con't be biosed in fovor of some s u b-grou p, for then it will lose oppeol to the members of thot group; it con't be biosed in fovor of ony porticulor individual, such os the proposer herself, becouse mony will hove no porticulor interest in the well-being of thot person; and so on . In foct, whot will be required is thot the principle be such os to recognize common interests. Whot might those be? And indeed, con we reosonobly suppose thot there ore ony?
The subject of 'common interests' must be treoted with coution. Whot we hove in mind here ore interests which o number of different persans hove in common, o concept which must not be confused with thot of interests in 'the common', or the community. Thus in o certoin community, o very few might be much interested in thot corrmunity os such, while the mojority simply don't core much obout it (this was Golbroith's comploint obout contemporory Americo) . On the other hond, it is hord to see how someone could ho ve o very plausible notion of community interests who did not suppose thot most of the people in the community in question hod an interest in whot he proposed. But it moy still be true thot most people ore not interested in their communities, even when its interest is so constituted.
The other point ls thot our common lnterests moy be ones thot don't outweigh our other interests. It moy be thot we cou ld ochieve something thot we genulnely do wont by uniting with our fellows in pursuit of a common interest; but whot we thus ochieve might also strike us, in bolonce, os not worth the trouble. Perhops we could hove o nice pienie together, but I would p r efer even more to stoy home ond reod o treotise on metophysics. But if morolity is to do whot our definition requir es, nomely to provide plausible principles on the bosis of which. we con rotionolly override interes ts to the controry, then they must be bosed on those common interests -if there ore ony -which outweigh ony such controry interests, in one woy or onother. Now, one woy in which they might do so is by simply being more importont to us, individuolly considered, thon the other interests with which they ore inconsistent. I moy much prefer the pienie to stoying home, ond so moy you. lf so, however, we would not need ony morol principles insisting, nagging, or bullying us into going on our · picnic! Thus we cannot ·simply identify moral principles with principles bidding us to do what the corrmon interest beckons us to do. In the face of some types of corrmon interesfs, morality is su perfluou s.
Where, then, are such principles needed? Here we may Iook with profit at a particularly interesting and by now fomiliar, dass of cases: those in which everyone's · pursuing his own interest without regard to others will Iead to our being worse off than we otherwise could be. The most important type is that exemplified by the Prisoner's Dilemma . This is the type of case where two or more parties are so related that their best outcomes, individually considered, are such that if both try to attain them; they end up worse off than they would in some other outcome that could be attained instead. Seeking the maximum, we end up worse off -not, indeed, with· the minimum, but the next warst thing to it -when instead we could, by cooperating, have the next best thing .. Yet in the absence of cooperation we will be strongly motivated to make the fatal move, for if we do not, we leave ourselves open to the warst outcome of oll. In the dassie story of 'The Prisoner's Dilemma', · if pris. oner A doesn't confess and Prisoner B does, A winds up with ·a long jail term and B with none at oll; if both confess, both get shorter. but still substantial jail terms; and if neither confesses, both end up with very short jail terms. No jail term at oll would of course be best from the point of view of either individual, given their interests. But if both confess in the. hope of achieving that best outcome, then both will endure a much Ionger sentence than they would if both remained silent.
An incidental virtue of this story is that the agents in it are criminals. The story shows that even they have o motive to cooperate which, from the perspective of the tiny 'group' comprising just the two of them, has the dassie properties of morality; each is tempted to 'rat' on the other, and for good reason -less time in jail ~ better, in their view, than more ; yet if both succumb to this temptation, they will pay a substantial price for their . misdeeds. Of course, from the point of view of the !arger society, it would be much better if both confessed: the criminals' temptation is the soeiety's virtue : None of this should be taken to be convincing evidence for moral relativism, however. For it may also be that everyone, induding the er iminals themselves, would be best off if nobody, induding the two protagonists, engaged in criminal activities. (Not only 'may' this be the case, but it is in our view a necessary condition of the !arger society's moral and legal principles being rationally acceptable.)
In the case where A remeins silent and B does not -B's best alternative -B gets off with. no sentence at oll. This fact about B, however, does not figure in A's motivation in the story. It would be quite a different story if in addition to his jail term, A suffers the outrage of being bested by a r ivol. We con even imogine o pair such thot A would rother go to joil himself, provided B goes there too, thon to remoin free . lt is an impo rtont point thot our theory of rationolity does not pronounce on t he inherent rationality of this sort of preference, even though most of us would be inclined to pronounce it o case of irrational jealousy. Nevertheless, various considerotions underwrite th is inclinot ion of ours. For unless A octually prefer s being in prison to being outside, he will also prefer B's being in prison ond hirnself remoining outside. Jealou sy, envy , spite, ond the like ore quite properly clossified os vices: dispositlons which there is generot reoson to discourage ond suppress rother than encouroge ond s timulote. A society of jeolous ond spiteful people is certoin to be a most uncomfor t able one, ond virtually certoin to be o very unhappy one os weil. l n so soying, however, we ore guided by CorrtTIOn experience ond familiarity with life, not by o priori inslght into the Form of Vi r tue. lt is not cleor whot it would meon to be 'guided by Pure Reason', bu t certainly we ore not so g ulded in the seorch for plausible moral pr inciples.
Even so, howeve r , there ore focts obout people thot so str ongly underwrite certoin particulor principles that there is some excuse for regarding them os o priori. One such is the principle of promise-keeping, or more generolly of doing one's part in arrongements voluntor ily unde r token between oneself ond other voluntarily acting persons. Obvlously this principle does not hove the stotus thot IITT11onu el Kant apporently thought it did: viz., of being 'rigorou s', thot is, of it s being impossible for an ything to justify breoking the principle in questlon on any occasion. Only o quite triviolized version, such os "Do not breok o promise when no othe r legitimote con siderotion s outweig h keepin g it", cou ld s urvi ve oll possible counter-exomples. Nevertheless the keeping of promises and other ogreemen t s is literolly o corrtTon interest. lt hos to be in the interest of the porties to the promlse, for otherwise no obligot ing promise exists (there ore olwoys ot least two, not just one: consider t he situation where A says to B, "I promise you I will do X", to which B replies, "Oh, no, you won't not on !!!l occount, anywoy!" Here, of cour se, there is no valid obligation to do X). And if the doing of the promised oction in the circums tances in which it is to be done is controry to no third party's interest (here agoin, a notion of "legitimote" interests is essen tial, however), the n humankind in generot will rationolly su pport the obligotion to keep that promise, if support is needed . ( Agoin, in o given case it might not be, e. g . because both parties o re by this time simply not ve r y interested in X's being done.)
It should be noted thot the publlc's interest in your keeping the promise thot ~ mode ot time t to person B, who occepted it fully, is not very great, directly. But everyone con be ond virtuolly everyone ofte n is o party to promises, orrangements, ond in generat to agreemen t s of oll sorts, and oll such are Hoble to the frustration ond poins of default on the part of the other person. The general support of the corrmunity on behalf of thls prlnciple is relatively .costless to oll: words are (fairly) cheap, and we only rarely need to get directly involved in most cases of others' promises. To cultivate a general attitude of indifference to the promises of others is to invite defaulting on the part of those you want to rely on, an d it is scarcely possible that this can be in your interest, whoever you are. And of course one can ovoid oll such obligations oneself simply by never making any agreements. If that is found intolerably inconvenient, then the point l'm arguing for is made.
For a group of voluntarily acting, rational agents, marality itself must be a kind of agreement, in the sense of a mutual understanding: namely, to perform those actions and refrainings from action the absence of which would make everyone worse off, so long as others do likewlse. The proviso is essential, and distinguishes this conception or · marality from 'categorical' ones, in which one is to stick to the indicated actions come what may. I don't hit you, provided that you don't hit me; but if you do, then I may employ "oll the helps and advantages of war", as Hobbes puts it (Leviathan, eh. XIV, First Law of Nature). Morality in general, then, will be that set of principles the universal observance of which would be better for oll, and general reinforcement of which is necessary because individual nonobservance, if one could succeed at it, would be advantageaus.
Peace
This brings us to the most interesting principle for present purposes: the principle of keeping the peace, and/or such other principles as would support that one. ls peace a 'common interest'? This is a critically difficult question, for many reasons. Let me first sketch what I take to be a general argument in favor. I shall then focus on two of what seem too me to be the most important of these difficulties, though there are certainly more.
For present purposes, peace is simply the absence of violence. There is some merit in Hobbes' suggestion that war consists not only, or even primarily, of violence as such, but more especially of a general disposition to violence. In the latter sense, we could speak of the 'cold war', for instance. However, the lengthy period known by that name has surely been very different from, and very much better than, what would have been the case had there been a 'hot' war during that time. 'Cold wars' are not strictly wars, uncomfortable though they may be. I propose, therefore, to confine the term to active wars. These are still dispositional in the important respect that there is not always fighting during a war; but what distinguishes it is that you simply can't depend on the absence of violence during such times. Here Locke's characterization applies: wars are "not o posslonote ond hosty, but o sedote, settled design upon onother mon's life" (Second Treotise, § 16) . The disposition to violence In war is so strong thot ony peoceful tendencies on t he port of the combotonts ore likely to be token by the enemy os occosions to ottock. During the 'cold war', on the other hond, the obsence of overt oggression by the other side is generolly motched by o similor obsence on one's own. ln war, unprovoked violence is the rule; in peace, it is ogalnst the rule, ond would be token os occosion for reply in kind, i.e. for war in the narrewer sense. What we coll 'cold war' mlght better be described os 'cold peoce': unpleosont, yes, but unlike war properly so colled, survivoble by oll.
Why think that, os between ony pair of porties, peoce is better thon war? There ls not much point in our expresslng preferences that don't reflect the interests of the parties concerned. We must osk, reolisticolly, whether there ls reoson to think that peace is better thon war from the polnt of view of both porties. In order to fit o prlnclple of peoce lnto our scheme, we need the following schedules of values by the porties concerned: oggression .!! better than peace in ony cose -o subject we will come to; but meonwhlle, we ore simply reoding aff the preferences of reolistically possible portles, ond it con hordly be doubted that there are parties with such preferences . Further, if they dld not at least hove the preference ronkings indlcoted, it is difficult to see how wors would ever occur; unless the change was a reversol of alternatives (2) ond (3), in which cose it is difflcult to see how they would ever ceose. We must, of course, say mor e obout thls later. Meanwhile, it ls cleor thot on ogreement between A ond B could not permit oggression os o meons of pursuing one's interests. Their common interest is option (2) rother than (1 ), as weil os, of course, Even successful oggression hqs costs, which is why ( 1) ronks oheod of (2). But t.he costs may be worth the price as compored with not trying, which is why (2) is, in this cose, ohead of (3).
Meonwhile, these ore des.ired outcomes rother thon actions: that A's oggression would be successful is not something determined entirely by A's octions. Whether A ottempts an ottock, on the other hand, may be entirely determined by A's octions, and for the present cose we will ossume that it is. A must, then, make o colculation of the probobility of success if he attacks. This figure must be high enough so thot the expected utility of attack, which is the utility of the outcome if successful times the probobility of success, is greater than the expected utility of peace. Under these ~ircumstances, A will not par.ticipote in o social contract and will in fact go to wor. What we need, therefore, in order to show thot peace is preferable to war, is to show that the benefits of successful aggression ore alwoys low enough, the costs of oggression greot enough, or the probobility of success low enough to keep the utility of oggression below the utility of peoce. Obviously this would be impossible if no restrictions whotever were put on the kind of peoce we hove in mind . A thoroughly unjust peoce would be worse than even o quite futile defensive war for many, perhops most, end of course for many Stetes. We need, therefore, some constroints on the sort of 'peoce' we ore considering.
And here, I think, is where the orgument gets off the ground. For the objective now is to determine whether o peaceful option olwoys exists which is preferoble to war from the point of view of both porties. Obviously this would also be impossible to demanstrete in the obstroct. We need to know whot sort of defensive resources ore ovoiloble to the porties concerned. Thomas Hobbes orgued that the 'stete of nature' was a stete of equality: "the weckest hoth strength enough to kill the strongest". lf we project the Sociol Controct for enough back so that no modern weopons ore avoiloble, or perhops no weopons ot oll, then Hobbes' cloim .is plausible, ot least ot the Ievel of indivduols. But even in that condition it would not provide an odequote orgument for peoce omong oll possible groups of people: in numbers there is strength, given good organization, even if we confine the groups to weaponless combat. In modern conditions, of course, the situation is wholly different. Tiny and technologically unadvanced states can be ob Iiterated by !arge and technologically advanced ones.
At this point, we need to address ourselves seriously to the question of baselines: at what point does the 'Social Contract' begin? Consider a weaponless state of nature with the contract made among oll individuals acting on their own, as in Hobbes' specification. It is plausible to suggest that such a contract would rule out the construction of weapons usable against humons altogether. Since that is impractical -after oll, weapons against animals would be agreed by oll to be legitimote, and most tools essential for many peaceful purposes are also usable as weapons if need be -this in effect must be a prohibition, not on the production, but only on the use of· such weapons for aggressive purposes.
A similar argument can be mounted for any envisigeuble condition of humankind: people in general cannot allow the use of ony weapons for aggressive purposes. But as a corrolary, the development of any weapons which could only be used aggressively, if there · are any such, would surely be prohibited. The way to conceptualize this is to think of people as uniting against ony potential aggressors and giving them their choice between forswearing aggression forever or eise fighting it out with this very !arge group now -with extremely dim prospects of success for the proposed aggressor. Every nonsuicidal rational being would sign · this agreement, and the rest may be ignored, having been eliminated at the outset in the proposed battle -which would, Iet us remember, have been wholly legitimate since at that point there were, by hypothesis, !!.2 agreed rules (and, also by hypothesis, only agreements matter when it comes to rules).
In an imperfect world, two important things will hoppen that complicate the situation, giving rise to the necessity for reasonable · principles allowing the deployment of weapons for defense. The fir st is that some will not adhere to agreements, however reasonable. The second is that there will be differences of view about fair or just agreements, especially those having to do with the all()cation of land and other natural resources, and often of the distribution of socially created goods as weil. Amang States, none is likely, any Ionger, to be so brazen as to insist explicitly on its liberty simply to ignore basic moral requirements; but still, most of them are likely to infringe such requirements covertly or to do what others will Interpret as such from time to time. But the belief that justice requlres X entails the belief that X may properly be secured by force if necessary. lt is not surprising, then, that States with disagreements carried on under the rubric of justice are potent sources .of armed conflict and of preparotion for same.
Obviously this creates the possibility that a rational 'super-morality' of the kind we seek is a simple impossibility, a will-o-the-wisp. We agree that justice can underwrite the use of force, and we disagree about what justice requires. lsn't that an end of the matter? Perhops not. For we moy find a c01'l'l'T10n interest in adjudicating such disogreements without resorting to force, at least in many cases. The most plausible comman value for this purpose is simply that of life itself. For Hobbes, and for mony philosophers, life hos been the 'bottom line', and for very good reoson. After oll, if one loses one's life, then that puts an end to one's ability to pursue one's goals and purposes in this world, whatever they moy be. lt is this last property of death that mokes it so signlficant for our purposes and provides the most extensive support for the view that peoce is better than war. Many moy at least profess to put no value on their own lives, regarding them as mere pawns for some !arger purpose. But if there are ony gomes to be ployed here ori eorth, even mere pawns will be useful only while olive -even if their moin value is achieved when they are sacrified. Even the Ayatollah Khomeini's human mine-detector troops have some positive marginal utility to him; it drops to zero only after a 's uccessful' detectlon! At SQille point, relegation of life to the latter status is obviously going to be troui;>lesome. But its moin trouble will be due to the effect it has on the value attached by such agents to the lives of others . lf one's own life has no value, it is understandable that one won't put much weight on the lives of others. Understandable, yes but still, not forgivab le and not tolerable. Certainly no rational, defense is possible of a principle, proposed for public acceptonce by voluntarily acting rational persons, which would moke everyone out · to be just so much cannonfodder in the hands of Allah, or the World Spirit, or whatever. We have no reason to talerate any who not only have such beliefs, but use them as their sole bosis for deoling with others. Such persans are indistinguishable from psychopoths, and we can deal with them only as enemies, to be caged or eliminated as soon as possible. All others afford the possibility of dealing with people on an acceptable basis. And this extends even to those parts of the subjectmotter of justice that may be under dispute. lt does so especially because of the possibility of drawing boundaries. Those who have one set · of beliefs · about the just distribution of products or of natural resources cannot, of course, expect those beliefs to be recagnized by oll as the basis for dealing with them; but they can tolerably weil realize them in quite !arge areos with identifiable boundaries. (Mostly, these areas are States, though it is important that they need not be.) Given boundaries, we can settle many disputes by simply agreeing to stay on our own side of them except by invitation. lndeed, the violation of this principle is precisely what 'aggression' refers to. Of course there will be disputes about precisely where the boundories ore, and on just what basis to drow them. But if the need for boundories is recognized, ond if it is ogreed to be more importont thon precisely where they ore to be drown, within some sort of reosonob le Iimits, then we hove o bosis for peoceful coexistence . ond . better: nomely, of peoceful interchonge. And so long os those on eoch side of-the boundory hove interests thot con be forworded by the octs of those on the other side, there will be mutuolly profitable interchonge, which could come to be extensive -os it is olreody, for instonce, even between notions on opposite sides of the 'Iron Curtoin'.
One further foctor enters the scene in the lotter port of our century. In the post ond continuing to the present, os noted obove, smoll ond technologicolly bockward countdes hove been defenseless ogoinst !arge ond technologicolly developed ones . But the odvent of nucleor weopons chonges thot recipe in one .cruciol respect. For countries thot ore smoll need not be technolog!Colly bockward ond those which ore not moy ovoil themselves of weopons thot would dount even the most powerful notions, by ony of the usuol meosures of power . It is becoming the cose omong notions os it olwoys hos been omong unormed men ond women thot, os Hobbes puts it, "the weokest hoth strength enough to kill the strengest" (Leviathan, eh. Xlllj. When we odd this to the equotion, the cose for the good of peoce is essentiolly complete. If the cost of og. gressive war ogoinst onybody becomes unenduroble, then nothing con be . goined by conquest ond peoce becomes the only rational option. Nor, os was suggested ot the outset of this essoy, do we even req uire · thot the notion ottocked be ormed in an y woy, if the ottock is corried · out with nucleor weopons. For the side effects of nucleor explosions in sufficient · quontity to destroy ony notion of more thon trivial size ore going to be visited upon the oggressor, ond not only on everyone eise. The situotion ot ·present, · so for os we know, .
is not yet thot the possession of significont orms by the notion ottocked mokes· less dlfference thon the expected side effects. But they moke o consideroble difference olreody, ond it would be o rosh person who would bonk on no further horrors being turned up in future to render oggression unprofitoble to oll concerned. This in oddition to the foct thot wors conducted with conventionol weopons ore .omply poinful even to greot powers, os both the United Stotes (in Vietnam) ond the Soviet Union (in Afghanistan) con testify.
But it would be rosh os well os sod to rest one's cose on this technicol eventuolity, likely though it is. It moy be supplemented by two, not unreloted, lines of reflection. ·One such is in the trodition of Kont's celebroted essoy on "Perpetu.:~l Peoce", in which he orgues thot liberolism is o virtuolly sufficient, ond probobly also necessory, couse of peoce omong notions. Kont's ideo hos received powerful support in o recent orticle by Michael W. Doyle ( 1983) , in which the outher points out thot while there hove been wors in the post two hundred yeors between liberal Stotes. ond nonliberaL Stotes, there hove been,. remorkobly, no wors ot oll between poirs of liberal Stotes. A Kontion occount of the underlying rationale of this seems opt. War between poirs of individuols who ore ot least very roughly equol in aggressive copobility is certoin to be unprofitoble if undertoken in pursuit of goins identifioble apart from psychiotricolly dubious 'volues'.
2 This is true of the rich ond the poor, ot least os much ond indeed probobly more so thon of porties also comporoble in point of current weolth. The poor connot expect to improve their situotions, in ony non-irrtToediote woy, by using violence ogoinst the rich, for two reosons which it is extremely importont to understand. The first is obvious: the rich con commond resources of defense for exceeding ony requirements thot oggression from the poor, if not oided by third porties, could impose. The poor con't conquer the rich becouse they con't offord it.
Yet onyone who could offord it would no Ionger be poor, ond would hove nothing to goin by militory conquest when the alternative is peoceful exchonge.
The second reoson is subtler but for more importont: robbing the rich will do no good in ony long run, becouse real weolth is not simply 'material'. The bosis of weolth is knowledge, ond if you kill off the rich, you goin only the fruits of their know-how but not the knowledge itself. Locking thot, however, the material goins of plunder will soon prove of no use. The secret of weolth is not ony kind of politicolly rectifioble 'exp loitotion', os mony Morxists seem still to think, ogoinst oll the evidence.
1t is, insteod, orgonizotionol ond technicol knowledge, which con be put to profitable use only 'in woys thot also profit those who ore 'exploited'. Enslovement is obsolete -though it is questionoble whether it ever was efficient even when in vogue. Even in South Africo, the block loborers who ore by western stondords so underpoid ore in foct for better off, moteriolly, thon their colleogues in technologicolly bockward but blockgoverned countries forther north, Iet olone thon sloves.
The foct thot individuols deoling freely with eoch other will prosper more, both individuolly ond collectively, thon those ottempting to deol with eoch other on the bosis of force ond violence, dominotion ond slovery, is in ~t self immensely significont. But it will not Iead to world peoce unless individuols hove o reosonoble · degree of control over their politicol destlnies. Stotes in which o comporotive few retoin effective politicol power hove motives to continue the obsolescent ond inhuman methods of orgonized violence. They require it to secure their positions of power, for one thing, ond of course the foreign relotions of such Stotes ore simply further meons to the some ends. An y hope for peoce between Stotes ot least one of which is 'orgonized' in thot woy is dependent on either the whims of those who control it, or on the bolonce of militory power. The prosperity of their citizens being o matter of strictly secondory concern to their rules, or perhops none ot oll, the incompetence of their politicol procedures for achieving that prosperity is of little avail for the securing of peace .
The second observation concerns a condition that no amount of political democracy, in the narrower sense of that term, could be proof against, but only liberalism in the more fundamental and deeper sense ln which · it includes a healthy appreciation of the r ights of persons. This condition, namely, is that interpersonal relations not be controlled by ideological fanaticism of any kind: the currently most salient cases being examples of religious fanaticism, though Marxism, in too mony instances, comes close enough to do as an example . For the fanatic, wordly wealth and even life itself is of strictly secondary importance as compared with the attainment of religious .domination, that is, the state of affairs wherein everybody accepts the fanatic's particular rellglou s views. What is important here is, of course, domlnation in general rather than rellgion in particular . In the favored Western cases, members of differing religlous groups have monaged to live in comparative peace, for the most part. This in in part because their religious views do not go very deep -otherwise it wou ld be astonishlng, for example, that when Americans move to different communities, they frequently join different churches simply because some other sect's chur ch is more conveniently located, or for purely sacial reasons. And it is in part because of a per ception that religious war is divisive and unprofltable -but then, this can be regarded as simply another indication that the religious motive is not very deep in such countries, for the kind of 'profit' lost by such wars must count more than the alleged spiritual benefits of the religion in question if such unprofitability is to matter. And finally, it is only 'for the most par t'. For we still see the phenomenon of persans attempting to impose aspects of their religious belief at the ballot boxes (think of many churches' political stands on abortion, e.g.; and rellgious belief has motivated the bombing of many abortion an· d birthcontrol centres in America). Even in the most favored cases, that is to say, we have yet to find the liberal attitude that others genuinely have a right to their own religious practices, or more generall y their own Jives, fully and universally instantiated. If this were to hoppen universally, then, I believe, Kant's case would be completely substantiated; for persans fully accepting such attitudes, war is simply out of the question .
lf peace, as founded on the liberal attitude t oward our fellow man, did not go hand in hand with prosperity, we may be sure that the prospects of peace would be much dimmer. Happily, they do. And while religions may try to persuade their adherants that worldly wealth is of small account as compared with religious zeal, we may be reasonably confident that their case will never have much effect e xcept among those so lacking in the former and so unlikely ever to enjoy it that' they can hardly have an unbiased view of the case.
ls lt rational to prefer worldly well-belng to ldeologicol fanoticlsm? Here we must make o dlstlnction. Reason, an the vlew adopted here, does not dietote volues. lt teils us what da da, glven our volues, and lt may be allawed a certaln portlallty in favor of the attltude of exposing one's volues to the facts, as obtalned by the methods of science; but it does not da what Plato clalmed for lt, viz. , to tell us what The Gaod is . Nevertheless, in the flr st of those two offices, lt teils us thot peace is preferable to violence glven o very wlde range of volues, thus to a large extent obvlotlng the need to add r ess the present questlon. And in the second, I think, lt ls llkely to Iead us to welgh those values reolizable by cooperative technologlcol attainment much mare heovily than ony supposed spiritual galns from the opposing set affered by the vorlaus fanaticisms. It will not have escaped the eye of mast of us that the Ieaders of these fonatical sects Invariable enjoy the material well-being of maharajahs rather than the primitive shepherds they urge thelr 'flocks' to emulate; ond for the rest, we are unllkely to find the conditlon of the lotter terrlbly ott ractlve as compared, say, wlth the life avoiloble to a typical Europeon productlon-llne worker, not to mention a cerparate executive, o Universlty prof!!ssor, or the occupants of any of countless other situotions one flnds in any secular liberal Stote .
What are we to conclude from these reflectlons? Not, of course, thot it is olways Irrational for ony State to engage in aggressive war . However, that is not what we were fishing for. The question is whether it is rational to accept o maral princlple condemning aggressive war, between parties of whotever slze and strength. And thls, I believe, does issue from these reflections. When ony stete, of whotever slze, engages in war nowodays, it does so under the clook of marallty, by lnslstlng either that it is crassing the other country's borders at the lnvltotion, or at least in the interests, of the people therein, or to right some previous wrang. That marallty may sometlmes be o cloak rather than a slncerely professed matlve ls true enough; but thls is very diffe r ent from the attitude, comman prior to this century, t hot prospect of succen and pollticol gain in the par t. icular cose was oll the 'justiflcation' requlred. Morolity and rotlonollty may not colncide in the short run, but a Ionger view will bring about a much greoter coincidence.
Nuclear Deterrence
The foregoing reflections present o case that is essentiolly for peoce os a means, not as an end in itself. It is, of course, a means to a vast vorlety of ends, ond thus comes rather close to the status it wou ld have lf it were genulnely an end in itself. Nevertheless, thls cose is such as to underwrlte equolly the right of defense when defense is needed. But the specific implication of that right ls whot comes lnto question when we consider the speciol but unhoppily prominent cose of defense ogoinst nucleor oggression, or of nucleor defense ogoinst militory oggression of other kinds. To oddress ourselves to the issues here, · we must first moke on importont distinction between two senses of the word "defense" -o brooder ond o norrower one (see discussion in Norveson 1986). In the brooder sense, "defense" refers to ony militory orrongements one undertokes in order to reduce the likelihood of the enemy's ending· up the militory victor in o conflict which he is ( presumed to be) threotening .to bring obout. Deterrence is one kind of 'defense' in this brooder sense of thot term. However, there is o norrower sense of "defense" in which it refers only to o subset of such meosures: nomely, those meosures which ore meont to moke it impossible, or ot least very much more difficult, for the enemy to ochieve substontiol destruction of one's own forces or whotever it is thot is under threot. Thus o sturdy woll is in this sense a defense ogoinst enemy orrows or, perhops, -18th Century connon, ond o TOW missile is o defense ogoinst tonks. And so on . These devices render the enemy's offensive weapons ineffectual.
In this lotter sense, we con distinguish between defense ond deterrence. Deterrence, by cantrast with defense, consists in toking measures which would moke it irrational for the enemy to ochieve those objectives. I con't stop your missiles from destroying my eitles, but I con threaten to reply in kind, imposing Iosses on you which will moke you think twice about imposing such Iosses on me.
lt is quite clear that in this norrower sense of the term "defense", there is, for the present ond the foreseeable future, no (effective) defense against nucleor ottock. As things stand, if the Americans or the Russions should take it into their heads to destroy some !arge city somewhere on the globe next week, there isn't a thing onybody con do to prevent this destruction from coming obout once the rockets are lounched . All onybody con do is either to try to tolk them out of it, in o spirit of negotiotion or concession or perhops ideologicol persuasion, or to threaten something sufficiently owful in reply to moke it very costly to do this. Only the Ietter is deterrence; in the norrow sense of "defense", it is not defense. A plausible view is thot only threatened retaliation ot o similor Ievel, viz. threatening to use nuclear weapons, would be sufficiently impressive to do this ogoinst ony enemy who would contemplote such a thing. And it is widely, and plausibly, thought thot this porticular choice of meons to this, os I insist, obviously legitimote end of defense, is especiolly problemotic. Thot is the claim I om considering in this section.
Whot one would be threotening in o policy of nuclear deterrence is, obviously, immensely destructive. lf it is ever justified to resort to such o meosure, it is evident, one would need to be justified in thinking that it was necessory, os compared with ony less potentiolly destructive meosure.
In the present world situotion, the question of necessity is obviously of poromount importonce, ond os I hove orgued elsewhere ( Norveson 1985c), Western reosoning obout this is subject to mojor c.riticisms, in principle ond in proctice. (My eorlier doubts obout this ore, in my judgment, strongly reinforced by Mr. Gorbochev's initiative in leeland in November 1986, an initiative flotly rejected by President Reogon . ) But the question of necessity in the present world situotion is not the one thot we ore investigoting here. I om insteod r01smg o question of fundamental principle: whether deterrence is o morolly legitimote option to consider in .2_!!Y circumstonces. We will, then, ossume, purely for the soke of the investigotion, thot nucleor deterrence is one's only hope -thot circumstonces ore such thot no other stonce would effectively deter or defend ogoinst the presumed oggression.
Why would nucleor deterrence be thought to be especiolly problemotic in principle? Certoinly it is, of course, especiolly dongerous. But thot would seem o difference in degree from other weapons. The question is, matters of degree aside, what · problems of principle are raised here? Perhops the following two features of nuclear weapons are those most plausibly regarded as representing samething special and different. First: at least so lang os we are dealing with the !arge, 'strotegic' type of nucleor weopon, it is impossible to confine the effects to combotonts. lndeed, nuclear war in its purest form essentially eliminates the category of 'combatants' in the usual sense of the term. Second, an all-out nucleor war, we now have good reason to think, poses a real threat of extermination to the human race.
Whether we should regard these as two Independent considerotions, or rother as o matter of the second being an extreme cose of the fir st depends on the weight one ottaches to the extermination threat. When an individual is killed, after oll, that individual is 'exterminated'. When the human race is killed off, there is an evident difference in degree; but is there samething further? True, the roce will disappear, but thot is only samething morally different if races count more than individuals. And this is a thesis I see no reason ·to accept on the face of it. lt is also true that future generations will not occur if the race is exterminated. But that matters more only if they count more than present ones -a thesis that I also see no r~oson to occept, on the foce of it. Moreover, if the concern is with possible, os distinct from octuol, individuols, then there is every reason to think that 'they' count less, if onything (see, for instonce, my 1978).
Nevertheless, philosophical writers on nuclear deterrence in the post few years have been much exercised about the first feoture,. whatever view one tokes on the second. Yet this feature is by no means unique to nuclear weapons. On the one hand, no weapon, including nuclear weapons, is l!l.:.
herent[y incopable of ever having its effects confined to combatants. So for as direct effects are concerned, it depends, plainly, on where those combatants are and where everybody eise is. All one con say is that with very !arge bombs, the likelihood of hitting the wrong people as weil as the 'right' ones is very high in typical cases. The same is true in many circumstances with smaller weapons: the firebombing of Dresden in World Wor II affected far mare than the t r ivial number of combatants in that unfortunate city, and any number of civilians have been trapped in smallarms crossfir e ever since such crossfire has been a feature of battle . Thus if we try to put our finger on the differences people a r e worrled about here, we agoin find that t hey are matters of degree .
The main worry about this matter has been in the context of intentionality.
It is one thing, many suppose, that noncombatants might accidentally be killed by o given use of o weapon, but quite another when one can foresee with certainty that they will be. Or it is suggested that nuclear deterrence involves intentional and even deliberate killing of noncombatants, so that it lsn't just a matter of foreseeability. And it can hardly be denied that there is o point of some kind he r e. lf some !arge city is targeted for nucleor destruction os a deterrent to nuclear ottock, then there is a sense in which one's killing of its inhabitants, if the misslle is octually fired, is inten tlonal .
The question is, however, whether this matters. That is to say 1 we have to osk whether there is a marolly sufficient reason, in the facts just cited, for refroining from nucleor deterrence. And it may surely be questioned whether the r e is. At any rate, I shall try to make o case for the legitlmacy of nuclear deterrence and then see whether it stonds up agoinst the proposed objectlon.
Now to begin with, we must accept that any use of force is subject to o requirement of necesslty: if the prlsoner is coming olong quietly, I am not justlf. ied in a pplying the losh; if the opposing battallon sends up a white flog, further shooting is out of order. And if there is no r eal th r eat to counter with one's deterrent strategy, or if it can be effectively countered in some less potentially violent way, then of course thot strategy is unjustlfied . In short we must, as usual, separate out the two issues: (a) whether there is any alternative to the kind of threat involved in nuclear deterrence, and ( b) whether the use of deterrence is justified e ven if t here is no effective alternative. Of course the r e is the fu r the r issue whethe r deterrence is effective anyway. This last question has been extensively explored in the literature, and I hove nothing to add to this. I sholl simply assume, as seems fairly evident to corrmon sense in ony cose, that it is effective; if it is not, then there is nothing to be soid for it anywoy ond the question is closed.
Regarding issue (o), it is obvious thot there will be major problems, in many coses, in ossessing o threat. In the Second World War, the Americans worked assiduously on the atomic bomb on the reasonable assumption that it was a race with Hi t ler's sclentists, a r ace on the outcome of which a great deal depended. l n fact, as we know, Hitler's mlll tary forces were subdued before the American bomb was operational. Japan's were not, however, and historians ever since have been debating whether American use of t he bomb on two Japanese eitles in the final days of the war was jus t ified on the basis offered: namely, that a great many mare lives, both American and Japanese, would have been lost had the bomb not in fact been employed. Was this necessary? Or would the Japanese have surrendered wlthout a major Invasion anyway? The question of fact is unllkely ever to be resol ved to everyone's satisfaction, to be su re; but it is not easy to reject the terms on which lt is discussed. There are e vident reasons for denying the analogy. Stetes are plainly not individuals but are instead artificial bodies whose members are indivlduals. In dividuals can exist without Stetes, but not vice versa; in at least t hat sense, individuols ore logicolly prior to Stotes. The motive of self-preservotion mokes emlnently good sense for individuols; but when one thinks of 1t, it mokes much less immediate sense in the cose of St.otes. For o Stote could be destroyed completely, utterly disoppeor, without o single individual in it being destroyed or even significontly discomfited -except, perhops, its offleials. lt is even possible thot those individuols should hove lost nothing they previously hod in the process. When we soy, os we did obove, thot Stotes will risk even onnihilotion to preserve their independence, we must therefore oddress ourselves to the only relevant question obout this: do we core? The porticular State to which we are ottoched must corry with it something of volue for us if it is to be worth our support. The independence of thot Stote, in particulor, must entail something of importance to us if we ore to be osked to risk our lives for it. We must suppose thot on bolonce we would be worse off without it, given the likely alternative, thon we would be with it.
It is foscinating thot immense numbers of people in todoy's world would probobly think it obvious that the independence of their porticular State.!.! worth such o risk, ot least if we con be guided by their octions; for it is surely true thot those people would in fact toke such risks for thot couse. Perhops they are thoroughly deluded in being thus willing. But being willing, we must perforce ossume thot they really volue their States' independence, and ask where we go from there.
Perhop s the number of those so willing is very much less thon implied obove. Thot would be importont, but the point mode has two sides to it, the second of which was not brought out obove ond is surely much more importont thon the first. The fir s t side is positive ottochment to one's own Stote, in its current constitution; the second, however, is aversion to the constitution ond politics of the State to which one would be Subordinate in the event of dealing with, soy, nuclear threots by copitulotion . And whatever moy be soid regording the former, the existence of hundreds of millians of persans of the lotter opinion is of great importonce in this connection. One ploce where t he 'oction' is on this issue, certoinly, is right here. Perhops it would be rational, os an oble colleogue of mine hos holf-seriously suggested, for every nucleor Stote to divest itself of its orms ond turn them over to the Soviet Union! Certoinly mony notions could do o Iot worse than to be in the situotion of contemporary Finland, if thot is the likely outcome.
But this is o digression. Our question is whot rights people hove, given their values, ond my cloim is thot they hove o very strong right of selfdefense. What we must ask in porticular is whether membership in a Stote threatened by some other State would give one the right to engoge in defensive actions which put ot risk the lives of persans other than those from whom one is defending oneself. (The 'octions' one engages in by virtue of membership in a State consist mainly in poying taxes -which one hos ' no choice obout onywoy. Thot su pport to the relevant Ievel is olmast entirely passive ls o matter of importance, but con't be pursued here.)
Agoin, port of the reply is evident enough: such risk could ot mast be justified by necessity. lf there ore other woys of defending oneself thot don't put innocents at risk, then one is certoinly obliged to use those insteod. But our ossumption here is thot there ore no such ways in the case of n ucleor weopon s. S u pposing this to be true, the situotion is this: A, the oggressor, threotens B with nuclear annihilotion unless B does x, something which, we will suppose, B has o perfect right not to do. B has in the circumstonces no woy of defending hirnself against A except deterrence (or, if you like: no woy of defending hirnself ot oll, but does hove the option insteod of resorting to deterrence). Deterrence will put many innocent third porties ot risk. Moy B use deterrence in these circumstonces? To say that he may not is to soy, so for os I con see, thot oggressors ore free to commlt their oggressions so long os they con maunt nuclear threots in support of them. Why isn't this rule by bullies?
The questionoble port, of course, is about the cloim thot this is the .2.!!!Y alternative. This is, to be sure, in need of clorificotion. Ploinly one can only meon that there ore no other occeptoble alternatives, for alternatives of some kind there ossuredly ore. For exomple, one con give in to the threat in question. Or one con say No but take no defensive meosures. This presumably might result not only in one's own destruction, but also that of many of the very people the threat to whom formed the objection to nucleor deterrence in the first ploce. Or one could try going guerillo, oll of the citizens ready to put up resistonce at the Ievel of streets ond olleys; or mass nonviolent resistonce. Why not these, then?
Further, I om weil aware that there hos been much discussion of lote on the question whether deterrence mokes ony rational sense: i.e. whether the maintenance of o lar~e supply of nucleor weapons with delivery devices in order to threaten onother notion with retoliation should lt use its similor force for aggressive purposes ·would constitute o credible threot to o rational State. For purposes of this inquiry, it is simply an operoting assumption thot it does. Does anyone suppose for one moment thot either the Russlons or the Americons have real ony doubt of th is in proctice? Not on my reoding of the evidence, ot ony rote.
But it doesn't matter. For we mu st remember thot whot we are considering ls the proposol that one is reguired to select one of these alternatives rother than thot of nucleor deterrence. Obviously if one doesn't think deterrence will work anywoy, then one's policies ore subject to one kind of rational criticism. But those who employ them for this purpose obviously reject thot criticism. So we hove the question whot kind of marol criticisms they ore eligible for, if ony, given their strotegic beliefs . To soy thot one is morolly required to reject deterrence is to soy thot one con be (moro11y) reguired to go to on inordinote ornount of trouble, risk of life, ond loss of independence in order to ovoid rlsk of llfe to innocent porties os o response to odmittedly wrongful threots . But why so? The ossumption is thot porty B, the victim of A's nucleor threots, ls likewise innocent . B is not more ellgible for picking on, morolly speoking, thon C, D, or whoever. lf A hos the right to impose these horrors ond inconveniences on B, why not equolly to do so on C, D, ond so on?
Perhops we should turn the question oround o little, ond osk whot the responsibillty of those lnnocent third porties is. lf oll ogree thot A hos no right to do these things to B, ond A goes oheod ond does them, B's response -nomely, to go oheod ond use deterrence on A, with resultont side risks to the others, in preference to some other response thot is for riskier ond more inconvenient for B -con also be regorded os o chollenge to oll those others to find some more sotlsfactory woy to reply to A, or to toke meosures to undermine A's obillty to mount thot threot in the first ploce. If they do not do ony of those things, why ore they in o positlon to insist thot B must ploy the 'fall guy'? lt's on old story, reolly. Defense ot some fundamental Ievel must be collective . We ore, os they soy, oll in this tagether . Thot we ore so is, in t he obove story, to be loid to the responsibility of porty A . Whot I deny is thot it would be proper to loy it oll on B, the Initial victlm. But thot is whot we do seem to be soying if we insist thot B's response must be selfdenying, indeed self-exterminotive. Not to mention thot there is the usuol problern for the others if thot is whot they insist on: which of them will be next, ond where is it going to end?
It is pointless to r eply thot if we choose deterrence, then we con a lso osk the question "where ls lt going to end?" -with ossuronce thot it wlll end in universal destruction . But for one thing, this is by no meons ossured. lf oll portles oct foirly rotionolly, then it will end, not in universal destruction but in o universal ogreement to dispense with nucleor orms. And for onother, it should not be thought just obvious thot if the choice is between universal succumbing to someone's totolitorionism ond universal dest r uction, thot the former is cleorly prefer oble. Of course there wlll be mony who do prefer thot. But the choice ls not in their hond s! The point rother is thot those who insist thot the vlctim, B, hos no right to selfdefense in the cose where the only defense is deterrence must exploln this deniol . in terms thot ore occeptoble to B. Locking thot, there simply ls no alternative to leoving the initiative wlth B, in our present cose. And lt is wholly understondoble thot B should choose the only option thot hos ony real promlse of securing his continued independence .
None of this should be construed as providing support for the current practlces and pollcies of any particular government. lf the foregoing considerations are tolerably near the truth, then it is the continued existence of the nuclear arms race that is puzzling, and the explanations for that perslstence must be sought elsewhere than In strateglc ratlonallty, Iet clone morallty.
But lt would be difficult to deny that peace should be sought more urgentl y and more energetlcally than It ls. lt was, for example, a lamentable chapter In the recent hlstory of humanity that so apparently hopeful an offer of nuclear peace as that of Premier Gorbachev at Reykjavik should have been rejected by President Reagan for so absurd a reason as that offered: 'Star Wars', to enable us ' to protect ourselves from the very threat that would be eliminated had the offer been accepted and seriously acted on. That Iasting peace between nation-Stetes is not something we can expect soon Is evidenced In a most melancholy way by such events. 
